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Abstract—The Layer 2 Atomic Cross-Blockchain Function
Calls protocol allows composable programming across Ethereum
blockchains. It allows for inter-contract and inter-blockchain
function calls that are both synchronous and atomic: if one
part fails, the whole call graph of function calls is rolled back.
The only existing atomic cross-blockchain function call protocol
is a Blockchain Layer 1 protocol, which requires changes to
the blockchain client software to operate. Blockchain Layer 2
technologies such as the one described in this paper require no
such changes. They operate on top of the infrastructure provided
by the blockchain client software. This paper introduces the
protocol, provides an initial safety and liveness analysis, and
presents the expected overhead of using this technology when
compared to using non-atomic single blockchain transactions.
The protocol’s atomic behaviour comes at the cost of additional
transactions. On the Root Blockchain, three transactions plus
one transaction for each Segment Blockchain where there are no
state updates and two transactions for each Segment Blockchain
where there are state updates is required.
Index Terms—blockchain, ethereum, cross, transaction, atomic,
performance
I. INTRODUCTION
The Layer Two Atomic Cross-Blockchain Function Calls
(LTACFC) protocol combines the ideas of Block Header
Transfer [1] for cross-blockchain consensus from BTC Relay
[2], Clearmatics’ Ion project [3], and Cosmos Inter-Blockchain
Communications (IBC) [4], with the ideas for coordinating
transactions and contract locking from Atomic Crosschain
Transactions [5], [6] and Atomic Cross Shard Function Calls
using System Events and Live Parameter Checking [7] to
provide an atomic synchronous composable cross-blockchain
function call technology.
Figure 1 shows a logical representation of a cross-
blockchain call graph using the LTACFC protocol. An appli-
cation creates a cross-blockchain function call that goes across
four blockchains. The Root Transaction executes function
funcA in contract ConA on Blockchain A, the Root
Blockchain. This function calls function funcB in contract
ConB on Blockchain B, that in turn calls functions funcC
and funcD. The function calls can update state on each
blockchain and return values across blockchains. The atomic
nature of the technology ensures that either all state updates
are committed or all are discarded.
Blockchain Layer 2 solutions do not change the blockchain
client software to operate. From the perspective of blockchain
systems, they act as applications. They can utilise smart
contract code and servers external to the blockchain to operate.
Blockchain Layer 2 solutions are appopriate for situations in
which users are unwilling or unable to modify their blockchain
client software.
Creating a cross-blockchain protocol that provides atomic
behaviour is a complex problem [8]. Creating a cross-
blockchain protocol that does not require changes to the
blockchain client software is significantly more challenging.
This paper introduces a new blockchain layer 2 protocol that
provides atomic cross-blockchain function calls, presents an
initial security analysis, and presents the expected overhead of
using this technology when compared to using non-atomic sin-
gle blockchain transactions. Additionally, this paper describes
how this technique could be modified for use as an Ethereum
2 Cross Shard function call technique.
The LTACFC source code is available on github.com [9].
The code is open source and available under an Apache 2
license.
This paper is organised as follows: the Background sec-
tion introduces Block Header Transfer for cross-blockchain
consensus and Ethereum. Next the LTACFC Protocol section
describes the protocol. The Performance Overhead section de-
scribes the expected overhead of using this protocol over using
separate single blockchain transactions. The Security Analysis
section analyses the Safety and Liveness of the protocol.
Finally, the Applicability to Ethereum 2 Cross Shard Function
Calls section explains the applicability of this protocol to
Ethereum 2.
Fig. 1: Cross-Blockchain Function Calls
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Fig. 2: Block Header Transfer
II. BACKGROUND
A. Block Header Transfer
Block Header Transfer [1] techniques rely on Relay Nodes
reading block headers from a source blockchain and sub-
mitting the block headers to a Block Header Contract on a
destination blockchain, as shown in Figure 2.
The methodology for the Block Header Contract trusting
the block headers is dependent on the particular scheme.
For instance, with BTC Relay [2], trust is derived from the
Proof of Work (PoW) difficulty of the Bitcoin blockchain in
combination with a reliance on multiple Relay Nodes being
prepared to present blocks from the best canonical chain. The
root of trust is an initial trusted block header, which could be
the genesis block. With Clearmatics’ Ion project and Cosmos
IBC the block headers must be signed by a threshold number
of trusted validators. In these cases the root of trust is the
set of public keys that are registered with the Block Header
Contract, one for each validator.
Transactions that leverage the block headers can be submit-
ted to the destination blockchain once the block headers are
trusted. The transactions contain a block hash, Merkle Proof
[10], and data. The data, in combination with the Merkle Proof
and the block header that matches the block hash prove that
the data was part of the block, and hence should be trusted.
The code in Any Contract in Figure 2 can execute logic
based on the fact that the data has been proven to have been
included in a block on the source blockchain.
An advantage of this type of scheme is that multiple trans-
actions that leverage the one block header can be submitted
to the destination blockchain. The complex cross-blockchain
consensus only has to occur once for all transactions that relate
to the block. However, some schemes, such as BTC Relay, rely
on all block headers being transferred, even if no transactions
will use them. An efficient scheme needs to be able to
determine which blockchains need which block headers, and
only transfer block headers that are needed. Doing this reduces
the amount of state growth on the destination blockchain
as unneeded block headers are not stored on the destination
blockchain.
B. Ethereum
Ethereum [11] is a blockchain platform that allows users
to deploy and execute computer programs known as Smart
Contracts. Smart Contracts are typically written in the Solidity
[12] programming language. Source code is compiled into
a bytecode representation. The bytecode is deployed to the
distributed ledger using a contract creation transaction.
Ethereum transactions update the state of the distributed
ledger, do not return values, and can emit log information.
In addition to contract deployment transactions, transactions
are also used to call functions in the Smart Contracts and to
transfer Ether, the native coin of Ethereum, between accounts.
View function calls can be executed on the Smart Contract
code. These View function calls return a value and do not
update the state of the Smart Contract.
Blocks consist of groups of transactions. Ethereum nodes
come to consensus to determine the next block that will
become part of the chain of blocks. As such, execution of
transactions involves nodes across the network. In contrast,
View function calls execute on a single node using the node’s
local copy of the distributed ledger.
Ethereum MainNet, the most widely used public Ethereum
network, uses a Proof of Work (PoW) [11], [13] consensus
algorithm. Ethereum 2, due to go live incrementally starting
in 2020, will use a Proof of Stake (PoS) [14] consensus
algorithm. Ethereum is also deployed in permissioned consor-
tium networks [15]. In these deployments Proof of Authority
(PoA) consensus algorithms such as Istanbul Fault Byzantine
Tolerant (IBFT) [16] and Istanbul Fault Byzantine Tolerant
version 2 (IBFT2) [17] are used.
A block is deemed final when it can no longer be changed.
All transactions contained within a finalised block are also
deemed final. PoW consensus provides probabilistic finality
[18]. As more blocks are added to the end of a PoW consensus
blockchain, the probability of old blocks being removed due
to a heavier chain being found decreases. PoS as implemented
in Ethereum 2 provides a combination of probabilistic finality
and fixed finality. All blocks are deemed final on the first
block of a new 32 block epoch. Within epochs, blocks have
probabilistic finality, depending on the number of blocks added
to the chain. PoA consensus blockchains using IBFT2 offer
instant finality [17]. A block is final as soon as it is minted.
C. Ethereum Transaction Receipts and Events
Transactions in Ethereum can generate log events program-
matically. This information is stored as logs in transaction
receipts. The transaction receipts for all transactions in a block
are stored in a modified Merkle Patricia Tree. The root hash of
this tree is stored in the Ethereum block header. The log event
information includes: the address of the contract that emitted
the event, an identifier known as a topic that specifies the type
of event that emitted, and a data blob containing the encoded
event parameters.
This ability to programmatically produce events can be used
to produce information on the source blockchain that can be
consumed on the destination blockchain. This is the technique
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Fig. 3: Example Deployment Architecture
that Clearmatics’ Ion project uses. It allows for information on
the destination blockchain to be effectively read information
from the source blockchain.
III. LTACFC PROTOCOL
A. Cross-Blockchain Consensus
Figure 3 shows an example deployment architecture for
the system. Multiple companies could host blockchain nodes
(shown in dark red) on a variety of consortium or public
blockchains. They could also host Relay Nodes (shown in
brown) to communicate block headers between blockchains.
An important aspect of the deployment scenario is that Enter-
prise 2 does not have any blockchain nodes on Blockchain
A, and Enterprise 3 does not have any blockchain nodes
on Blockchain C. The cross-blockchain consensus must give
Enterprise 2 and 3 enough information about transactions that
have occurred on the blockchains they are not part of, to
be certain that those transactions have been included in the
respective blockchains.
There are three alternative methodologies for transferring
signed block headers. The appropriate methodology is de-
ployment dependant. The first approach is that each enterprise
signs a block header and submits the block header along with
their signature in a transaction to the destination blockchain.
There are two issues with this approach. Firstly, if there is
a lack of crossover between blockchains, then only a small
number of enterprises would sign block headers from one
blockchain when destined for another blockchain. This would
reduce the enterprises that don’t have nodes on the source
blockchain’s ability to trust block headers from the source
blockchain. A second issue with this approach is that a
transaction needs to be put onto the destination blockchain for
each relay node. This will impact on the performance of the
destination blockchain as one transaction per enterprise will be
submitted to the blockchain, to communicate the block header
and the enterprise’s signature.
The second approach is that each enterprise could broadcast
signed block headers to all other Relay Nodes that belong to
enterprises that have nodes on the blockchain. Each Relay
Node would gather signatures for a block header. Enter-
prises that have transactions that need the block header to
be transferred from one blockchain to another could submit
a transaction containing the multiply-signed block header.
Subsequent transactions to add the same block header would
fail. An issue with this approach is that (N − 1)2 messages
need to be communicated between Relay Nodes, where N is
the number of Relay Nodes for a blockchain.
A final approach is to request block headers be signed when
needed. When an enterprise needs a block header transferred to
a blockchain, it requests all other Relay Nodes on a blockchain
to sign a block header. They gather the responses and submit
the multiply signed block header in a transaction to destination
blockchains. Subsequent transactions to add the same block
header would fail. This approach would result in 2 × N ×
(N − 1) messages if all enterprises simultaneously needed a
block header signed. However, this would be a good approach
when block header transfer was only needed intermittently.
For the second and third alternative, rather than using
ECDSA signatures, BLS threshold signatures [19]–[21] could
be used. This would have the advantages that the signature
would be small, and the number of signers and which signers
signed the message could be kept secret.
B. Cross-Blockchain Control Contract
Cross-Blockchain Control Contracts are used to manage
parts of a cross-blockchain function call. An instance of this
contract is deployed to each blockchain that will participate
in cross-blockchain function calls. The address of the contract
and the blockchain identifier of the blockchain are registered
with Block Header Contracts on all blockchains. This allows
events emitted by this contract to be trusted as being from
a Cross-Blockchain Control Contract. The following sections
describe the main functions of the contract.
1) Start: The Start function is called on the blockchain
which contains the entry point function call for the cross-
blockchain function call, the Root Blockchain. The function
registers the account that will submit all of the transactions on
all of the blockchains, the call graph of the cross-blockchain
function call including expected function parameter values, a
time-out in terms of block time stamp of the Root Blockchain,
and a cross-blockchain transaction identifier. This information
is emitted in an event know as the Start Event. The transaction
that submits the Start function call is known as the Start
Transaction.
2) Segment: The Segment function is called to request a
function on a contract be called as part of a cross-blockchain
function call. The Start Event, the block hash of the block
containing the Start Transaction, a Merkle Proof proving the
Start Event is related to the block, and an indicator of where
the function call lies in the call graph are submitted as
parameters to prove that this function is part of the cross-
blockchain function call. The code is able to verify that the
latest block it has received from the Root Blockchain has a
block time stamp older than the time-out value. Additionally,
a set of Segment Events containing function call return results,
with block hashes, and Merkle Proofs are passed in to prove
that subordinate function calls on other blockchains have been
3
Fig. 4: Sequence of Function Calls
called and have returned certain results. These function call
results match function calls that are described in the Start
Event.
When the application contract code executes, if a cross-
blockchain function call is encountered, the application code
calls a function CrossCall in the Cross-Blockchain Control
Contract, passing in the actual parameters of the function call.
The CrossCall function compares the actual parameter values
with the expected parameter values as specified in the Start
Event. The function returns results that have been indicated
should be returned in Segment Event for the function call.
Section III-E describes contract locking, which is used if state
updates occur.
A Segment Event is emitted to publish the return result or
error result of the function, and the list of locked contracts. The
transactions that submit the Segment function calls are known
as Segment Transactions and the blockchains they execute on
are termed Segment Blockchains.
3) Root: The Root function is called on the Root
Blockchain to call the entry point function call for a cross-
blockchain function call. The Root function call has similar
parameters to the Segment function call, taking a Start Event
and a set of Segment Events, along with the block hashes and
Merkle Proofs to allow the event contents to be validated.
Similar to the Segment function call, expected and actual
parameter checking is completed along with contract locking.
If a Root function call completes successfully, any locked
contracts on the Root Blockchain are unlocked and provisional
state updates are committed. A Root Event is emitted indi-
cating that all provisional updates on blockchains should be
committed. The Root function emits a Root Event indicating
that all updates on all other blockchains should be discarded
if any of the Segment functions returned error results or if an
error occurs while executing the entry point function call.
If the time stamp of the most recent block on the Root
Blockchain is after time-out, then any account can submit a
transaction that calls the Root function to cancel the cross-
blockchain function call. In this situation a Root Event in-
dicating that all updates on all other blockchains should be
discarded.
4) Signal: The Signal function is called on blockchains that
have updates that need to be committed or ignored. The Start
Event, Root Event, and Segment Event for the blockchain,
along with block hashes and Merkle Proofs are passed in as
parameters. Calling the function requests that contracts on a
blockchain locked due to a state update due to a Segment
function call be unlocked and the state updates be either
committed or ignored depending on the information in the
Root Event. A Signal Event is emitted to indicate that the
contract has been unlocked.
5) Clean: The Clean function is called on the Root
Blockchain to remove the cross-blockchain identifier from the
Cross-Blockchain Control Contract, thus terminating the cross-
blockchain function call. The Start Event, all Segment Events,
and all Signal Events need to be submitted along with proofs,
so that the control contract can be sure that all contracts
that were locked due to the cross-blockchain function call
have been unlocked prior to removing the cross-blockchain
identifier.
C. Call Graphs and Reverse Order Execution
Figure 1 shows a logical representation of a cross-
blockchain call in which an application creates a cross-
blockchain function call that goes across four blockchains. The
set of Cross-Blockchain Control Contract function calls that
should be executed to affect this is shown in Figure 4.
Walking through the call sequence diagram in Figure 4:
1) A Start Transaction is submitted to blockchain A, caus-
ing the Start Event to be emitted. The block header
that the transaction is included in is transferred to all
blockchains that are part of the call graph.
4
Fig. 5: Contract Call Flow
2) Segment Transactions are submitted to blockchains C
and D. These execute the leaf parts of the call graph.
Segment Events are emitted. The block headers for
blocks that these transactions are included in are trans-
ferred to the blockchains that they will be needed on.
3) A Segment Transaction is submitted to blockchain B.
This executes the call next up the call graph from the
leaves. A Segment Event is emitted. The block header
for the block that this transaction is included in is
transferred to blockchain A.
4) The Root Transaction is submitted to blockchain A. This
executes the root part of the call graph and emits a Root
Event. The block header for the block containing the
transaction is transferred to the blockchain that had a
state update: blockchain C.
5) A Signal Transaction is submitted to blockchain C to
commit the provisional state update. A Signal Event
is emitted. The block header for the block that this
transaction is included in is transferred to the blockchain
that it will be needed on: blockchain A.
6) A Close Transaction is submitted to blockchain A to
terminate the cross-blockchain function call.
It should be noted that Figure 4 makes some assumptions:
• The diagram only shows blocks being produced when
transactions are present. Many consensus algorithms pro-
duce blocks irrespective of whether there are transactions
present.
• The diagram shows block production times synchronised
across blockchains. This is typically not the case.
• It has been assumed an instant finality consensus al-
gorithm such as IBFT2 [17] has been used on all
blockchains. Block headers can only be transferred once
a block is deemed final.
D. Contract Call Flow
Figure 5 shows the call flow between contracts to facilitate
LTACFCs. Walking through the steps in the diagram:
1) The application submits Start, Segment, Root, Signal,
and Close function calls to the Cross-Blockchain Control
Contract.
2) The Segment, Root, Signal, and Close function call
parameters include Merkle Proofs to prove events from
other blockchains are valid. The Block Header Contract
is used to check the validity of this event information.
3) The Segment and Root function calls execute functions
on business logic contracts.
4) These business logic contracts may in turn call other
business logic contracts.
5) If a business logic contract can be updated as part of
a cross-blockchain transaction, it will have a Lockable
Storage Contract associated with it. This contract will
hold all state that is modifiable during a cross-blockchain
call.
6) As part of the locking mechanism, Lockable Storage
Contracts need to check with the Cross-Blockchain
Control Contract to check whether a read or write is
happening in the context of a cross-blockchain function
call or not.
7) Business logic contracts may also include cross-
blockchain calls. To check that there is linkage between
Root and Segment calls, the business logic contracts
pass the function calls to the Cross-Blockchain Control
Contract to check that the actual blockchain id, contract
address and parameters for the cross-blockchain function
call match the expected values from the Start Event.
E. Locking
Lockable business logic contracts hold the parts of their
data that can be updated in a cross-blockchain function call in
Lockable Storage Contracts. These contracts hold state updates
due to cross-blockchain calls as provisional state updates. They
commit or discard the provisional updates based on Signal
Transactions. The algorithms for processing read requests is
shown in Listing 1, write requests is shown in Listing 2, and
signalling requests is shown in Listing 3.
Listing 1: Locking: Read Request Processing
1 If caller is not Business Logic Contract {
2 throw an error
3 }
4 Check Cross-Blockchain Control Contract:
5 is there an active cross-blockchain call?
6 If not (normal single blockchain call) {
7 If locked {throw an error}
8 Else (not locked) {Read from normal storage}
9 }
10 Else (this is a cross-blockchain call) {
11 If locked {
12 Check Cross-Blockchain Control Contract:
13 has this cross-blockchain call previously
14 locked the contract?
15 If no {throw an error}
16 If yes {Allow the read. If the value isn’t
17 available in provisional storage, return
18 the value in normal storage.}
19 }
20 Else (not locked) {Read from normal storage}
21 }
Listing 2: Locking: Write Request Processing
1 If caller is not Business Logic Contract {
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2 throw an error
3 }
4 Check Cross-Blockchain Control Contract:
5 is there an active cross-blockchain call?
6 If not (normal single blockchain call) {
7 If locked {throw an error}
8 Else (not locked) {Write to normal storage}
9 }
10 Else (this is a cross-blockchain call) {
11 If locked {
12 Check Cross-Blockchain Control Contract:
13 has this cross-blockchain call previously
14 locked the contract?
15 If no {throw an error}
16 If yes {Write to provisional storage}
17 }
18 Else (not locked) {
19 Lock the contract.
20 Indicate in the Cross-Blockchain Control
21 Contract that this call is locking the
22 Lockable Storage contract
23 Write to provisional storage
24 }
25 }
Listing 3: Locking: Signal Request Processing
1 If caller is not Cross-Blockchain Control
2 Contract {
3 throw an error
4 }
5 If committing updates {
6 Apply updates from provisional storage
7 }
8 Else (discarding updates}
9 Delete provisional storage
10 }
11 Unlock the contract
F. Simulation to Create Call Graph
A parameter to the Start function call is the call graph to be
called including function parameter values. A code execution
simulation needs to be run in the application to determine
expected parameter values. The simulation will need access
to values from the called blockchains to determine expected
parameter values if any of the values depend on contract state.
G. Call Graph Limitation
An enterprise can only submit cross-blockchain transactions
across blockchains that they have access to. For example, in
Figure 3, Enterprise 1 can submit transactions that go across
Blockchains A, B, and C, but Enterprise 2 can only submit
transactions that go across Blockchains B and C.
IV. PERFORMANCE OVERHEAD
This sections describes the expected impacts on perfor-
mance of using this technique when compared to submitting
multiple single blockchain transactions.
A. Transactions Per Second
Table I shows how many transactions are needed to process
a cross-blockchain function call using the LTACFC technol-
ogy. The number of function calls is dependant on the number
of Segments, which relates to the size of the call graph. This is
because the Root Blockchain needs to have access to the block
Blockchain Number of Transactions
Root Blockchain 3 (Start, Root, Clean)
+ 1 for each Segment (no updates)
+ 2 for each Segment (updates)
Segment Blockchain 2
(no updates)
Segment Blockchain 4
(updates)
TABLE I: BLS Signature Verifications
headers for the blocks that included transactions that executed
a Segment function call from each of the blockchains in the
call graph, so the Close function call knows which Segments
resulted in locked contracts. For example, if the call graph
shown in Figure 1 was processed then the Root Blockchain
would need to process seven transactions.
The transactions used in this technology are each likely to be
complex. The transactions to submit block headers will require
verifying signatures. The Root, Segment, Signal, and Close
function calls involve verifying Merkle Proofs. This additional
processing is likely to reduce the number of transactions that
can be processed in a block.
In traditional Ethereum View calls, the return value is
determined by executing a function based on an Ethereum
node’s local copy of the distributed ledger. With LTACFC,
cross-blockchain function calls that return values to other
blockchains need to included as transactions. This means that
all nodes on a blockchain need to be involved in the process
of executing the function call, rather than just one node.
B. Transaction Size / Networking
The Start, Root, Segment, Signal, and Close function calls
all have large parameters such as calls graphs and Merkle
Proofs passed to them. It can be expected that the size of the
transactions will be larger than typical transactions. Depending
on the signing methodology (see Section III-A), multiple
transactions may need to be communicated between Relay
Nodes to sign each block header.
C. Memory
No significant impact is expected for memory usage.
D. Disk / State
Log events are used in this technique to publish a variety of
information including call graphs, function return results, and
lists of locked contracts. These large log events are stored on
disk.
The block headers are stored in blockchains to allow values
emitted in events to be validated. The impact of this storage
could be reduced by just storing the Merkle Root of the
transaction receipts. Additionally, old block headers could be
removed.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The property of atomicity in this protocol can be split into
the following safety and liveness properties.
It has been assumed that:
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1) Block header transfer mechanism is trusted.
2) Root transaction will eventually (after a finite number
of steps) be submitted either by the application or by
others.
3) Signal transactions will eventually (after a finite number
of steps) be submitted either by the application or by
others.
4) Number of Byzantine nodes on each blockchain is
less than the limit imposed by its enshrined consensus
protocol.
A. Safety
Claim: Suppose that the LTACFC cross-blockchain protocol
has finished executing a cross-blockchain transaction c. Then:
• If c succeeds then the protocol successfully commits the
state updates of all the associated (Root and Segment)
transactions,
• If c fails then the protocol rolls back the state updates of
all the associated transactions.
Case Analysis: Analysed the different ways (cases) the
LTACFC protocol can finish.
Happy case: When all transactions go through as planned
before the time-out, we have that the Root Transaction com-
mits the updated state on the Root Blockchain, and records the
commit message in the Root Event. The trusted block header
transfer mechanism along with the submission of Signal
Transactions on subordinate blockchains, the provisional states
are committed to the respective blockchains.
Failure of a Segment Transaction or Root Transaction:
If any Segment Transaction fails, then the corresponding
Segment Event records an error. Subsequently, the Root Trans-
action processing reads that error, records an Ignore message
in the Root Event, and discards the provisional updates of
the Root Transaction. When Signal Transactions are submit-
ted with this Root Event showing the Ignore message, then
the provisional updates on subordinate blockchains are also
discarded.
Failure of the Start Transaction: When the processing of a
Start Transaction fails, the Start Event is not emitted. Without
the Start Event and its Merkle Proof, the Root Transaction nor
the Segment Transactions can be processed. The entire cross-
blockchain transaction never gets processed. This is vacuously
equivalent to a failed cross-blockchain transaction resulting in
discarding of provisional states.
Timeout: In this scenario, we have the Start Transaction
successfully processed. The Root Transaction and zero or
more Segment Transactions were not processed prior to the
Cross-Blockchain Timeout. In this case, from the assumption,
we have that the Root Transaction is submitted eventually,
and its processing records the Ignore message in the Root
Event, due to the timeout. Again from the assumption, we have
that the Signal Transactions are eventually processed and the
provisional updates on other blockchains are discarded.
B. Liveness
Claim: The LTACFC protocol terminates after a finite
number of steps.
Case Analysis: The Cross-Blockchain Timeout for a cross-
blockchain transaction is recorded in the Start Event. The
Start Event is included in the Root Transaction as well as
other Segment Transactions. Hence, the protocol is designed
to complete the transaction under consideration within the
timeout period. From the assumptions we have that the Root
Transaction and the Signal Transactions are submitted within
a finite number of steps. Hence, the LTACFC protocol always
terminates.
Note that there are no centralised entities in this protocol,
apart from the relay nodes. From the assumption that the block
header transfer mechanism is trusted, and from the assumption
that the number of Byzantine nodes in a blockchain is less
than the limit imposed by its enshrined consensus protocols,
we have that the nodes becoming Byzantine does not affect
the termination of the LTACFC protocol.
C. Deadlocks and Livelocks
The liveness property implies that the LTACFC protocol
is deadlock free. However, the LTACFC protocol is not
livelock free. Consider the case of two applications A1 and
A2 submitting two cross-blockchain transactions T1 and T2,
both wanting to update the same contracts C1 and C2 on
blockchains B1 and B2 respectively. Application A1 has as
the target of the Root Transaction contract C1 and application
A2 has as the target of the Root Transaction contract C2.
The Segment Transactions will go through, locking contract
C2 for application A1 and contract C1 for application A2.
However, the Root Transactions to update contracts C1 and
C2 will fail as the contracts would already be locked. Both
cross-blockchain transactions will fail. The applications could
repeatedly resubmit these transactions, and repeating the same
failure situation. Hence, it possible for the LTACFC protocol
to be in a livelock continuously.
D. Replay Protection
The Start function call is called with a Cross-Blockchain
Function Call Identifier. The identifier is emitted in the Start
Event. This identifier and the Root Blockchain’s identifier are
recorded in the Root Blockchain and Segment Blockchains
Cross-Blockchain Control Contracts to ensure Segment Trans-
actions and Root Transactions aren’t submitted more than once
for the once cross-blockchain call.
VI. APPLICABILITY TO ETHEREUM 2 CROSS-SHARD
FUNCTION CALLS
A simplified variant of the LTACFC protocol could be
used for Ethereum 2 Cross-Shard function calls. Nodes on
Ethereum 2 shards post root hashes called Crosslinks to the
Beacon Chain. The Crosslinks for all shards are available to all
shards in the next block. This mechanism of cross-linking in
combination with Ethereum 2’s shared consensus mechanism
replaces the cross-blockchain consensus mechanism described
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in Section III-A. The rest of LTACFC protocol should be
directly applicable as an Ethereum 2 Cross-Shard function call
mechanism as described in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces the LTACFC protocol. This protocol
provides atomic, synchronous, inter-contract function calls
across blockchains, without the need to alter the blockchain
client software. No other technology provides the atomic
capability and operates at Blockchain Layer 2. The protocol
ensure updates across blockchains are either all committed or
all ignored. This complex functionality comes with the cost of
reduced blockchain system performance. For example, for a
call graph involving four blockchains, this technology requires
seven transactions on the blockchain that contains the entry
point function call, rather than the one that would be required
for traditional transactions that do not offer atomic behaviour
and cross-blockchain function call linkage.
The performance of the LTACFC protocol depends on the
size of the cross-blockchain call graph. Architects utilising this
technology need to understand the call graph of their cross-
blockchain function calls to determine the expected system
performance. They need to determine important high value
transactions that need to be cross-blockchain to minimise the
impact on performance.
This technique could be used for Ethereum 2 cross-shard
function calls. In this shard-consensus scenario, the transac-
tions required for cross-blockchain consensus would not be
required. This means that this technique could be used with
Ethereum 2 without the same degree of performance overhead
as has been described in this paper.
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